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Specialization
vs. Generalism
I have been a convinced eclectic,
generalist, and holist since 1962 or so. As a result, I have not found the
last forty years to be at all hospitable, since the
specialized-methodological model has increasingly dominated the
university.
An eclectic is topic-oriented,
problem-oriented, or question-oriented. Once he begins with a problem, he
looks around for tools capable of handling it. (The toolbox metaphor is
characteristically pragmatist, but has been used both by Foucault and by
Wittgenstein.) A methodologist, by contrast, decides on a method
(“paradigm”) and then looks for problems to use it on.
A specialist divides reality up
into “fields”, based on the spatial metaphor, and chooses to become expert
on one or a few of them. A generalist realizes that he can’t know
everything, but is not timid about going into new areas, and realizes that
in many cases topics which do not seem to be related actually are. The
holist is a generalist who tries to describe an overall picture.
Academic life, especially grad
student training, strongly favors the analytic movement (dividing up a
question and dealing with part of it) over the synthetic movement (putting
things into a larger context, seeing things as related which had formerly
been dealt with as separate.) Both methods are intellectually valid, but
it’s not hard to find people who seem unaware of this. It would seem
obvious that the job of thinking comprehensively is capable of being done
either well or badly. But there are those who disagree:
In earlier eras, when it was not obvious that the scope of human
knowledge far exceeded what could be encompassed by a single mind, the
challenge of explaining how everything hung together was not transparently
unmanageable. Today – when single minds cannot encompass substantial sub
areas of any established discipline – it is. The solution is not to do
badly what cannot be done, but to do well what can – to construct a series
of limited, but accurate and overlapping, syntheses that together
illuminate reality as we know it. This, I argue, is what we should ask of
analytic philosophy.
(Scott
Soames’ response to Richard Rorty)
What Soames says is true of every
area of study. No one can know all of physics, or all of chemistry, yet
physicists and chemists still make general statements about physics and
chemistry. If a new discovery in a specialized area seems to contradict
what has been thought to be a fundamental principle of the science,
there’s a flurry of activity until either the problem has explained away,
or the whole science has been revised.
The reason why it doesn’t work
this way in philosophy is probably because philosophy, contrary to the
claims of its advocates, is not yet a well-formed science on the type of
physics; there really is no overall theory to revise. (Scientists seem
less defensive about generalist writing than writers from fields that are
regarded as “softer”. Right at hand I have excellent philosophical books
by Stephen Jay Gould, Ilya Prigogine, Francisco Varela, Antonio Damasio,
Stuart Kauffman, and Ernst Meyer. You only wish that philosophers would
write that way.)
One way of thinking about
generalism is to think of two highly-intelligent friends who have
specialized in widely different fields, but who retain a curiosity about
one another’s work. (Each, in other words, is an expert in his own field,
but a layman in the other’s). Imagine each of them writing a generalist
description of his own field of study for the benefit of the other. The
result would be two non-technical generalist works of the highest quality.
It seems reasonable that
generalist thinking should be fostered in the university, and the
departments where generalism would seem most appropriate are history,
literature, and philosophy. But nowadays these departments, too, have been
methodologized, so an eclectic generalist like me really has nowhere to
go. The university has apparently abandoned generalist thought. This
amounts to the abandonment of public philosophy to street preachers,
demagogues, and hack journalists. Every department nowadays wants to be an
expert discipline with specialist methodologies and paradigms, and the
ones that think of themselves as more successful in this regard sneer at
the others (“butterfly collecting and social work”.)
The fields in which generalist,
eclectic thinking would seem most comfortable are history, philosophy, and
literature. History seems to be doing fine, with some pressure from
econometricists, etc. Philosophy seems totally lost and destroyed. English
is embattled. Post-modernism, which seems so eclectic and holistic,
actually functions as an imposed methodology, and furthermore has the kind
of extreme messiness that gives holism and eclecticism a bad name. People
assure me that our present era is a post-post-modernist, “generation z” or
something like that, but the new historicism that supposedly replaced it
seems to be the same kind of algorithmic cake-mix-recipe methodologism
that I’m arguing against.
In short, I think that history,
literature and philosophy should be holistic, generalist, eclectic – and
proud! It’s worth doing, and where else is it going to be done?
Longer and more schematic
version of this
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I am emersonj at gmail dot com.
Original materials copyright John J
Emerson
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